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NOTES AND COMMENTS
jury, to settle whether a future application of the regulations that may
never occur would be valid."'38 This statement seems to be an accurate
appraisal of the decision.
The great difference in the position of the plaintiffs in the several
cases becomes obvious when one considers the possible harm that might
result to each while waiting for the regulations to be applied. The
CBS decision was based on the irreparable injury that plaintiff would
suffer by reason of contracts lost on account of the regulation.3 9 The
Storer case seemed to require no threat of irreparable injury in order
to justify judicial review of a regulation, but merely that the regulation
control the business affairs of the party seeking review. Thus the
Supreme Court has become increasingly liberal in allowing direct review
of administrative regulations without waiting for them to be applied.
The cases from the other states reveal that some of the successful
plaintiffs asked for an injunction or a declaratory judgment. No North
Carolina case was found in which the plaintiff asked for either of these
remedies in seeking review of an administrative regulation. The New
Jersey court granted relief to the Sperry & Hutchinson Company
40
under the New Jersey Declaratory judgment Act.41 The Minneapolis
Federation of Men Teachers 42 also got relief under the Minnesota act.43
The North Carolina Declaratory Judgment Act44 does not differ in any
material particular from the acts of those states. It might be that a
contrary decision would have been reached if the plaintiff in the Duke
case had sought a declaratory judgment under the North Carolina act.
WILLIAM G. RANSSDELL, JR.
Constitutional Law-Congressional Investigations-
Contempt of Congress
Defendant, an instructor at Vassar College, was subpoenaed to
appear before the House Un-American Activities Committee and was
asked by the Committee a series of questions tending to elicit from him
whether he was or had been a member of the Communist Party and
whether he knew that one Crowley, who had identified defendant as a
member of a communist group while the latter was a student and in-
structor at the University of Michigan, had been a member of the
"351 U.S. at 212.
"See Justice Harlan's dissent in the Storer case, 351 U.S. at 211.Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v. Margetts, 25 N.J. Super. 568, 96 A.2d 706 (Ch.
1953), aff'd, 15 N.J. 203, 104 A.2d 310 (1954).
'
1N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A :16-52 (1952).
"Minneapolis Federation of Men Teachers v. Board of Educ., 238 Minn. 154,
56 N.W.2d 203 (1953).
"MiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 555.01-.15 (1947).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-253 and 1-256 (1953).
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Communist Party. Defendant refused to answer these questions on the
grounds that such interrogation violated the first' and fifth2 amend-
ments. He was convicted3 of contempt of Congress 4 and the court of
appeals affirmed. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals, 6 and remanded the case "for considera-
tion in light of Watkins v. United States."7 On remand, in the case
of Barenblatt v. United States,8 the court of appeals again affirmed the
conviction.
In the Watkins case, the Supreme Court reversed the contempt
conviction of Watkins, a labor organizer, who had testified freely and
fully about his own past Communist activities, but who refused to
answer questions as to whether he had known certain other persons to
be members of the Communist Party. The Court found that Watkins
was not given sufficient information as to the pertinency of the ques-
tions to the subject under inquiry and held that he "was thus not
accorded a fair opportunity to determine whether he was within his
rights in refusing to answer, and his conviction is necessarily invalid
under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
The Barenblatt case is one of several recent cases involving prosecu-
tions for refusal to answer questions propounded by congressional in-
vestigating committees which were pending in the federal courts when
the Watkins decision was rendered. Some of these cases have since
been decided.10 It seemed apparent, in view of the strong language"'
'Defendant maintained that the first amendment prohibition against congres-
sional lawmaking involving the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly includes a
like prohibition against any form of congressional intrusion in these areas. The
Court in Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957), seems to apjrove
this contention when it says, "Clearly, an investigation is subject to the command
that the Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or press or
assembly. While it is true that there is no statute to be reviewed, and that an
investigation is not a law, nevertheless an investigation is part of lawmaking.
It is justified solely as an adjunct to the legislative process. The First Amend-
ment may be invoked against infringement of the protected freedoms by law or
by lawmaking."
'Defendant maintained that an indictment under 52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C.§ 192 (1953), the contempt statute, was void because the contempt statute, when
applied to the Committee's authorizing resolution, is void for vagueness and thus
in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Defendant did not
rely on the provision against self-incrimination.
'United. States v. Barenblatt, Criminal No. 1154-54, D.C.D.C., March 15, 1956.
"52 STAT. 942 (1938), 2 U.S.C. § 192 (1953).
' Barenblatt v. United States, 240 F.2d 875 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
'Barenblatt v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957.).
1354 U.S. 178 (1957).
'252 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
9354 U.S. at 215.
"0 Sacher v. United States, 252 F.2d 828 (D.C. Cir. 1958), affirming 240 F.2d 46(D.C. Cir. 1957) on remand it 354 U.S. 930 (1957) (refusal by lawyer to tell the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee whether he was or had been a member of
the Communist Party) ; Singer v. United States, 247 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1957)
reversing on rehearing 244 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (refusal by teacher to
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used by the Court in Watkins concerning the House Un-American
Activities Committee Charter,12 that the decision therein would have
an important effect on all pending and subsequent prosecutions for con-
tempt of Congress. Apparently the Court itself considered Watkins to
have such an effect for the Court granted certiorari, vacated the judg-
ments of the court of appeals, and remanded, for consideration in light
of Watkins, the Barenblatt,'3 Sacher,14 and Flaxer,15 cases, the only
three contempt cases then pending before the Supreme Court. Two of
these three cases have been reheard and decided after remand, yet in
both rehearings the court of appeals affirmed its earlier decisions sup-
porting conviction.' 6
In Barenblatt, the court was asked to acknowledge that "the Supreme
Court in Watkins struck down the resolution creating the Standing
Committee on Un-American Activities . . . and that prosecution based
on refusal to answer questions asked by the Committee or a Subcommit-
tee questioning thereunder must necessarily fall in that the resolution on
which the indictment is based fails to meet the requirements of due
process; and second, assuming this was not the case, that part of the
opinion in Watkins relating to pertinency is dispositive of the present
identify for the House Un-American Activities Committee the names of others with
whom he had participated in Communist activities) ; United States v. Peck, 154
F. Supp. 603 (D.C.D.C. 1957) (refusal by newspaperman to identify for the
Senate Internal Security Subcommittee the names of others with whom he had
participated in Communist activities); United States v. Lorch, - F. Supp. -
(S.D. Ohio 1957) (refusal by teacher to tell the House Un-American Activities
Committee whether he had been a Communist at a certain time in the past).
11 "An excessively broad charter, like that of the House Un-American Activities
Committee, places the courts in an untenable position if they are to strike a balance
between the public need for a particular interrogation and the right of citizens
to carry on their affairs free from unnecessary governmental interference. It
is impossible in such a situation to ascertain whether any legislative purposejustifies the disclosures sought and, if so, the importance of that information to the
Congress in furtherance of its legislative function. The reason no court can make
this critical judgment is that the House of Representatives has never made it.
Only the legislative assembly initiating an investigation can assay the relative
necessity of specific disclosures." 354 U.S. at 205-06.
1 "The Committee on Un-American Activities, as a whole or by subcommittee,
is authorized to make from time to time investigations of (1) the extent, char-
acter, and objects of un-American propaganda activities in the United States, (2)
the diffusion within the United States of subversive and un-American propaganda
that is instigated from foreign countries or of a domestic origin and attacks the
principle of the form of government as guaranteed by our Constitution, and (3)
all other questions in relation thereto that would aid Congress in any necessary
remedial legislation." H.R. REs. 5, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 99 CONG. RFc. 18, 24
(1953).
" Barenblatt v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957).
, Sacher v. United States, 354 U.S. 930 (1957).
'" Flaxer v. United States, 354 U.S. 929 (1957) (refusal by union president to
produce union records, including a membership list, for the Senate Internal Security
Subcommittee).
" Flaxer v. United States, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1958), affirming 235 F.2d 821
(D.C. Cir. 1956); Barenblatt v. United States, 252 F2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
affirming 240 F.2d 875 (D.C Cir. 1957).
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case."' 7 The court held that Watkins did not strike down the resolu-
tionl8 because 1) the Court would have said so explicitly if it had
intended to do so; 2) the Court would have reversed on the authority
of Watkins rather than remanded for consideration in light of Watkins;
and 3) the Court did not repudiate other convictions under the same
charter to which it referred in Watkins. The court then goes on to hold
that Barenblatt had been made fully aware of the subject under inquiry
and was thus able to see the pertinency of the questions thereto, the
court considering the questions to be pertinent. By rejecting the argu-
ment as to the effect of Watkins on the resolutions and by deciding the
case on the basis of pertinency to subject matter, the court implies that
all Watkins requires is that the questions be pertinent to the subject
matter under inquiry and that the witness be informed of the subject
matter in one of five ways' 9 so that he can gauge the pertinency of the
questions thereto. But a careful reading of the Watkins opinion seems
to indicate that the Supreme Court is saying a good deal more than this.
First, the Supreme Court seems to say that the congressional in-
structions to a committee, which are embodied in the authorizing reso-
lution,20 must spell out that group's jurisdiction with sufficient par-
ticularity2' to enable the courts to ascertain dearly that Congress ordered
the specific investigation and desires the particular information which
the witness refuses to divulge.2 2 This point is especially crucial because
if it were decided that Congress had authorized the committees to com-
pel answers to such questions as are involved in these cases, the courts
might find it necessary as a last resort to declare unconstitutional the
authorizing resolutions as being violative of the first amendment" as,
indeed, several Justices have implied.24  To avoid this extremity, the
" 252 F2d at 130.
"8 "We are of clear opinion that Watkins did not void [the resolution]." 252
F.2d at 132.
" (1) The authorizing resolution; (2) the opening remarks of the chairman,
members, or counsel of the committee; (3) the nature of the proceedings; (4) the
questions themselves; and (5) the chairman's response to an objection on per-
tinency. 354 U.S. at 209-14.
20 "Those instructions are embodied in the authorizing resolution." 354 U.S. at
201.2 Ibid.
The importance of this prerequisite to a valid committee use of the subpoena
power is emphasized by Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Watkins,
354 U.S. at 217. The authorizing resolution in Barenblatt and United States v.
Lorch, - F. Supp. - (S.D. Ohio 1957), is the same as that in Watkins. As
Judge Youngdahl lucidly shows in United States v. Peck, 154 F. Supp. 603
(D.C.D.C. 1957), the authorizing resolution of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, through which the Internal Security Subcommittee derives its authority,
is rife with the same vagueness and ambiguity which the Court vigorously con-
demned in Watkins, 354 U.S. at 201-06. This is the same authorizing resolution
as is involved in Sacher and Flaxer, which the Court remanded for consideration
in light of Watkins.23 See note 1 supra.2 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 196-98; See also Sweezy v. New
[Vol. 36
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Court has announced that "whenever constitutional limits upon the in-
vestigative power of Congress have to be drawn by this Court, it ought
only to be done after Congress has demonstrated its full awareness
of what is at stake by unequivocally authorizing an inquiry of dubious
limits. ' ' 25 If the Court in Watkins did not expressly say that it struck
down the resolution there involved for vagueness, it went to great
lengths in citing vaguenesses for naught. It is possible that the reason
the Court did not hold so explicitly is that the Court was obeying the
doctrine that required it to decide a case on the constitutional issue only
as a last resort. In the Watkins case the Court was able to show that
the witness had not been apprised even of what the Committee considered
to be the subject under inquiry and was thus not accorded due process.
Another explanation is offered by Chief Judge Edgerton in his Baren-
blatt dissent when he argues that when "there are two grounds, upon
either of which an Appellate court may rest its decision and it adopts
both, the ruling on neither is obiter, but each is the judgment of the
court and of equal validity with the other. And even if the Supreme
Court's demonstration that-the Committee on Un-American Activities
had no authority to compel testimony were obiter, this court should
defer to it."2 6 But the clear meaning of the Court's words in Watkins
is that the resolution is void for vagueness whenever a criminal prose-
cution is based upon it. In remanding instead of reversing the Bareg-
blatt, Sacher, and Flaxer cases, the Court was following the practice- of
allowing lower courts to rectify their own mistakes, as Chief Judge
Edgerton points out in his vigorous dissent in Barenblatt.27
Secondly, the Supreme Court has indicated that the subject matter
of the investigation must be clearly within the congressionally authorized
scope of inquiry.28 "
Thirdly, the Court says that the questions asked by the committee
must be pertinent to the validly authorized subject of inquiry.29 Finally,
the Court requires that the witness be given such information as will
indicate "what is the topic under inquiry" and must have explained to
him "the connective reasoning whereby the precise questions asked relate
to it."30 In the Barenblatt case, the court found that the statement of
committee counsel had informed the defendant of the subject of the hear-
ings and that, therefore, the defendant could gee the obvious pertinency
of the questions to the announced subject.3 ' The court did not discuss at
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 251 (1957) ; id. at 261 (concurring opinion) ; United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 58 (1953) (concurring opinion).
" United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 46 (1953).
20 252 F.2d at 138. 27 Ibid.
"United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
.- 354 U.S. at 208. 30 Id. at 215.
31252 F.2d at 136.
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all the question of whether the committee-determined subject falls within
the scope of the authorization given the committee by the House of
Representatives. By thus placing the entire emphasis of the Watkins de-
cision on the application of the pertinency of questions to subject matter
requirement, the court of appeals makes it possible for a committee to
define its investigation in whatever terms it wishes and then to ask
questions pertinent to this self-established subject. This is precisely the
evil practice the Court proscribes in Watkins.P2
Hence, it would seem that, given the decision of the Court in
Watkins and the obvious fact that the Court saw a clear connection be-
tween that case and the three remanded cases, the court of appeals might
have found one of the following: 1) the witness had not been informed
of the subject lawfully under inquiry,3 3 2) the specific questions in-
volved were not pertinent to the lawfully authorized'inquiry, 3) the sub-
ject under inquiry was not within the Committee's scope of authority,84
4) the resolution authorizing the investigation was void for vagueness,
this being a criminal prosecution based thereon, as being violative of the
fifth amendment, or 5) the resolution authorizing the investigation was
void as a violation of the first amendment. Although the Supreme Court
in Watkins pointed in the direction of the third or fourth choice, the
court of appeals, en banc, held in Sacker and implied in Barenblatt that
the resolutions involved were sufficiently definite to authorize the in-
vestigations. It would seem that having found in both cases that the
questions were pertinent to the subject under inquiry, the court would
have been obliged to discuss the question of whether the subject under
inquiry was within the committee's authority. The disposition of these
two cases seems to be inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Watkins and, indeed, with the per curiam reversal in light
of Watkins by the same court of appeals of its decision in the Singer
case.25
In summary, it would seem that Barenblatt ignores the Watkins
requirements for a valid prosecution for contempt: (1) a constitutional
grant of authority explicitly inclusive of the investigation rather than
simply not exclusive of such investigation ;36 (2) a specific investigation
within the grant of authority; (3) questions clearly pertinent to such
investigation, the relevance to which must be determined as of the time
3 354 U.S. at 205.
" This was the express holding in Watkins.
' This was the holding in the Rumely case. 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
" Singer v. United States, 247 F.2d 535 (D.C. Cir. 1957), reversing 244 F.2d349 (D.C. Cir. 1957). This case has the identical fact situation as does Watkins.
The other cases differ in that the information refused was of the defendant's own
activities. A careful reading of Watkins reveals that the Court did not consider
this point sufficiently important to qualify its decision by making such a dichotomy.
31 354 U.S. at 204.
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when asked and not "looking backwards from the events that tran-.
spired" ;37 and (4) a witness being fully apprised of the way in which
the questions are pertinent. If the main emphasis of Watkins is not
placed on the requirement of explicit congressional authorization, then
that case tells us nothing new other than listing five ways by which a
witness may be informed of the subject under inquiry 38 The require-
ments of pertinency of questions to subject matter 9 and of pertinency
of subject matter to congressional authorization40 have long been de-
clared to be essential. To read the Watkins decision in any other light
removes from that case the vital impact the case was expected to have4 '
on the entire practice of congressional investigations. 42
JOEL L. FLEISnXAN
Constitutional Law-Double Jeopardy-Conviction of Murder in the
First Degree After Reversal of Conviction of Murder in the Second
Degree
In Green v. United States' .the petitioner had been indicted in the
District of Columbia for first degree murder. Upon a verdict of guilty
of murder in the second degree, he appealed and obtained a new trial.2
On remand he was again tried for first degree murder, and this time
convicted of that charge and sentenced to death. The United States
Supreme Court held that the second trial for first degree murder put
the petitioner in jeopardy twice for the same offense in violation of the
Federal Constitution.3
The reasoning of the Court was that the petitioner was not required
to -waive former jeopardy as to the charge of first degree murder in
order to have a new trial of his conviction for second degree murder.
The effect of this decision is that when an accused is tried for first degree
'
7 Ibid.
38 See note 18 supra.
"McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 176 (1927).United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
"As Justice Clark says in his dissent in Watkins, "As I see it the chief fault
in the majority opinion is its mischievous curbing of the informing function of
the Congress." 354 U.S. at 217.
"Cf. United States v. Brewster, 154 F. Supp. 126 (D.C.D.C. 1957) (in con-
victing the President of Western Teamsters Conference for refusal to produce
union records subpoenaed by the Investigations Subcommittee of the Senate Gov-
ernment Operations Committee, the court sustained the Committee's power to see
the records in order to check the truthfulness of reports filed by the union with
the Department of Labor); Federal Communications Comm'n v. Cohn, 154 F.
Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (court held that the F.C.C. had been given sufficient
power by Congress to subpoena financial records of television finances in an in-
vestigation of radio and television networks).
1355 U.S. 184 (1957).
'218 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cr. 1955).
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in part, "[N]or shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ... .
19581
